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Strategic Insights: Speed Kills—Enter an Age of Unbridled Hyperconnectivity
June 9, 2017 | Mr. Nathan P. Freier
This month, a team of U.S. Army War College (USAWC) researchers concluded a yearlong
study on enterprise-level risk and risk assessment inside the Department of Defense (DoD). At
Our Own Peril: DoD Risk and Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World argues for a new
Department-level risk concept for describing, identifying, assessing, and communicating risk in
an environment defined by sudden disruptive change. It suggests that a new concept should rest
on four foundational principles: diversity, dynamism, persistent dialogue, and adaptation. 1
Among At Our Own Peril’s many insights, perhaps the most enlightening are those
concerning the strategic environment and the complex hazards emerging from it. The report
characterizes the contemporary environment as one of “post-primacy,” where the United States
remains a global power, but one that is commonly confronted by purposeful and contextual
defense-relevant challenges that fall considerably outside of the DoD’s dominant bias and
convention.
The study suggests that the most transformative characteristic of the contemporary
environment is the sudden onslaught of threats emerging from the dark underside of
hyperconnectivity.2 It is difficult to exaggerate the degree to which hyperconnectivity enables—
according to the study’s authors, researchers, and the defense-focused communities of interest and
practice it consulted with—the following:





Hostile or disruptive virtual mobilization worldwide;
The collapse of privacy, secrecy, and operational security;
Penetration, disruption, exploitation, and destruction of data storage and
transmission, as well as the use of data and data-enabled systems; and finally,
The unfettered manipulation of perceptions, material outcomes, and
consequential strategic decisions through the strategic employment of various
forms of information.

A NEW APPRECIATION FOR INFORMATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
HOSTILE COMPETITION AND WAR.
That which is loosely identified as the information sphere and—indeed often wrongly
characterized exclusively as the cyber domain —has of late become the world’s most contested
and congested competitive space.3 Indeed, while well-meaning strategists and planners work
through the incredible complexity of cyber competition and conflict, the broader competitive space
that revolves around information has rapidly transcended the challenges of ones and zeros alone. 4
On the first, second, and third points, At Our Own Peril makes the following basic
observations. First, the proliferation of portable communications and computing devices—

matched with their inevitable interconnectedness—unavoidably increases the ability of purposeful
actors at and below the state level to communicate, plan, agitate, and execute profoundly disruptive
acts that range from the unprovoked and malicious to targeted and incredibly destructive.
Furthermore, the same connectivity also becomes a vehicle for the rapid, viral transmission of
equally disruptive information, emerging more organically and triggering unanticipated,
seemingly leaderless security challenges. The latter are literally unbounded, borderless, and
virtually—at times—uncontrollable.5 In the study team’s view, the strategic significance of
hyperconnectivity cannot be overstated. Currently, imagination is the only barrier to the worst
possible manifestations of this increasingly complex challenge to U.S. interests and enduring
defense objectives.
On the second point, it is clear that Americans (elite or otherwise) no longer benefit from an
assumption of privacy to the extent that they are connected to the information grid. Virtually,
anyone can be found, exposed, extorted, embarrassed, robbed, harmed, or intimidated from either
open or anonymous sources as long as they remain “plugged in” and active on the worldwide web. 6
With the collapse of personal privacy comes the inevitable elimination of secrecy and operational
security from a national security and defense perspective as well. Wide uncontrolled access to
technology that most now take for granted is rapidly undermining prior advantages of discrete,
secret, or covert intentions, actions, or operations. 7
The wide proliferation and use of cellular devices capable of high-definition recording matched
to their capability for immediate transmission of sound, pictures, and written text is transforming
both how the world gets its most up-to-date information, as well as fundamentally undermining
the ability of the world’s militaries and intelligence services to operate with a modicum of
operational security. Furthermore, individuals, groups, and states are now able to access imagery
and sensitive open source information that once was tightly controlled by governments. In the end,
senior defense leaders should assume that all defense-related activity from minor tactical
movements to major military operations would occur completely in the open from this point
forward.8
On the third point, the secure storage, transmission, and use of data and data-enabled systems
are under persistent assault. From a cyber perspective, unconnected or closed systems are frankly
never completely closed.9 Open systems are literally open to all. Finally, connected but encrypted
systems are in fact first “connected” and then “encrypted.” They are, therefore, neither closed nor
unbreachable. Consequently, state secrets, sensitive or proprietary information, and information
enabled technical systems face concerted efforts to penetrate, expose, and/or manipulate them for
a variety of motives. The defense-related hazards are myriad in this regard.
A DIFFERENT MORE SOPHISTICATED APPRECIATION OF INFORMATION AS
A WEAPON.
Recent events indicate that hyperconnectivity as it relates to the fourth point—unfettered
manipulation of perceptions, material outcomes, and consequential strategic decisions—may just
be the most immediately consequential. Largely free riding on the back of a metastasizing global
cyber superstructure, actors are increasingly weaponizing information, disinformation, and
popular disaffection in order to bypass the traditional defenses of target states and institutions.
Furthermore, the incidental or accidental weaponization of the same is increasingly creating
unguided and unintended collateral effects from the strategic to tactical levels of decision and
action. There are countless examples of these impacts in the contemporary environment. 10

Now, as information literally travels at light speed, it is very difficult to limit its adverse effects.
Sometimes the exposure or exploitation of high-impact information is fact-free. Sometimes it is
fact-inconvenient. Still other times it is fact-perilous. Finally, there are times that it is facttoxic.
The first proliferates in ways that undermine objective truth. In short, once fact-free
information is deposited in or employed through the information sphere, the real story is lost in a
sea of alternative realities. George F. Kennan was prescient in this regard when he observed, “the
truth is sometimes a poor competitor in the market place of ideas—complicated, unsatisfying, full
of dilemmas, always vulnerable to misinterpretation and abuse.” 11
Fact-inconvenient information exposes comprising details that by implication undermine
legitimate authority and erode the relationships between governments and the governed. Factperilous data gives away the keys to the castle—exposing highly classified, sensitive, or
proprietary information that can be used to accelerate a real loss of tactical, operational, or strategic
advantage. Finally, exposed in the absence of context, fact-toxic information poisons important
political discourse and fatally weakens foundational security at an international, regional, national,
or personal level. Indeed, fact-toxic exposures are those likeliest to trigger viral or contagious
insecurity across or within borders and between or among peoples.
WAKE-UP! THE PROBLEM IS BIGGER THAN CYBER.
In light of all of this, securing computer networks and cyber lines of communication from the
predations of opportunistic opponents remains a critical component of U.S. defense calculations.
However, this is essential but also insufficient in the contemporary environment. Indeed, to date,
American strategists have focused to the point of distraction on defense against the purposeful
interruption or destruction of the U.S. information-focused connective tissue, as well as intrusion
into and damage to sensitive information repositories. However, consequently, they have been less
focused on the purposeful exploitation of the same architecture for the strategic manipulation of
perceptions and its attendant influence on political and security outcomes. 12
This idea of the grid as a vulnerability, a vector, and a weapon is an important future risk
consideration for the DoD. Further, the ongoing revolution in connectivity will continue to
transform how the DoD perceives and responds to hazards and calculates the risk factors related
to all three considerations.
At Our Own Peril found a single core defense implication of hyperconnectivity—“speed
kills.” With hyperconnectivity comes a quantum increase in the velocity of change in strategic
circumstances. It raises the specter of sudden, violent, or disruptive political contagions; rapid,
unintended military escalation; as well as war prosecuted by alternative—even overtly nonviolent—means at increasingly faster processing speeds. Furthermore, it enables virtual
mobilization and distributed collective action under no centralized authority or control and at
speeds that will outpace any 20th century bureaucracy’s ability to adapt or respond.
When combined, these all add up to a much more complex and uncertain decision-making
environment for senior defense and military leaders. The United States can clearly build more
layered defenses against cyber-borne attacks on data and infrastructure. However, the most
effective adversaries and adversarial forces have moved on to newer, more insidious methods.
Human perceptions and the relative value of truth have increasingly become ripe territory for low
risk/high impact manipulation of strategic outcomes, promising outsized strategic effect compared
to relatively small investments in resources.
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